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This study examines the effects of guanxi and audit independence on the corporate tax aggressiveness of Chinese firms.  
Based on a survey completed by 174 respondents in 2013, we find that two types of guanxi: favour-seeking guanxi and rent-
seeking guanxi are significantly associated with ethical judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness.  Perceptions of audit 
independence in-fact are significantly negatively associated with these ethical judgments, whereas audit independence in-
appearance is positively associated with them.  Further, significantly positive associations exist between perceptions that tax-
aggressive activities are good for the firm and its shareholders and favour-seeking guanxi and between these perceptions and 
stronger client-auditor relations.  This study provides insights into the association between types of guanxi and the propensity 
of firm management to engage in corporate tax aggressiveness. 
 
Keywords: Guanxi; ethical judgments; corporate tax aggressiveness; audit independence, China; survey; international. 
 
  
                                                          
1 School of Accounting, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, Western 
Australia 6845. 
2 School of Accounting, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, Western 
Australia 6845. 
3 School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. 
 
 





The social and political relationships, or interpersonal bonds (guanxi), among Chinese 
entrepreneurs can have a profound influence on business outcomes (Sharkey, 2008; Tu 
et al., 2013).  In China, guanxi, or the establishment of relationships or connections 
with business partners, is considered necessary to acquire resources, obtain approvals 
or bureaucratic privileges, facilitate the achievement of business outcomes, or reduce 
the risk that those outcomes will not be achieved (Hwang et al., 2009; Liu et al., 
2011).  
In this study, we examine the association between guanxi and audit independence and 
ethical judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness
3
 in Chinese firms that operate in an 
international context.  An evaluation of guanxi is important, as relations established 
between management and auditors and between management and government officials 
such as tax officials may have a bearing on management’s propensity and opportunity 
to reduce the corporate taxes payable.  Prior studies on international corporate tax 
aggression have demonstrated that, in many Western economies, firms can use 
elaborate strategies to reduce corporate income taxes, including aggressive transfer 
pricing, income shifting and the strategic use of debt and tax haven-incorporated 
subsidies (Slemrod, 2001; Rego, 2003; Braithwaite, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Taylor & 
Richardson, 2013).  However, little work has been carried out on managers’ 
motivations and capabilities for reducing corporate income taxes in relation-based
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cultural and political regimes such as China.  
Based on a survey completed by 174 respondents from both listed and unlisted firms 
in 2013, we find that two types of guanxi—favour-seeking guanxi and rent-seeking 
guanxi—are significantly associated with judgments of tax avoidance.  Perceptions of 
audit independence in-fact are significantly negatively associated with these 
judgments, whereas audit independence in-appearance is positively associated with 
them.  Further, significantly positive relations exist between perceptions that tax-
aggressive activities are good for the firm and its shareholders and favour-seeking 
guanxi and between those perceptions and stronger client–auditor relations.  These 
results are generalisable across China despite the economic and social diversity of the 
country’s provinces because guanxi is pervasive throughout China’s social and 
organisational activities, is culturally rooted, and is critical to achieving business 
success regardless of whether enterprises are foreign-owned, domestic government-
owned, or domestic public-owned (Fan et al., 2012a).  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it extends the recent 
literature on the business decision-making of Chinese firms (see, e.g., Liu et al., 2011; 
Tu et al., 2013).  It is also the first study to examine the association between favour-
seeking guanxi and rent-seeking guanxi in conjunction with external auditor 
independence and perceptions of corporate tax aggression by Chinese firms.  Given 
the size of the Chinese economy and the importance of guanxi in determining business 
                                                          
3 Corporate tax aggressiveness is defined here as any transaction or event that leads to a reduction in the 
amount of corporate tax paid by the firm (see, e.g., Dyreng et al., 2010).  Tax aggressiveness may be 
achieved through legitimate methods in accordance with tax legislation provisions or involve 
structuring transactions or activities with the principal objective of decreasing the amount of corporate 
tax payable. 
4 A relations-based economy is one in which transactions are based on personal and implicit agreements 
(Liu et al., 2011). 
 
 




decisions and culture, it is important to gain an understanding of the relationship 
between these two types of guanxi, auditor characteristics and corporate tax 
aggression.  Indeed, very little is known about the determinants of corporate tax 
aggressiveness in relation-based economies such as China.  The findings of parallel 
studies (see, e.g., Liu et al., 2011; Tu et al., 2013) suggest that elements of guanxi and 
auditor characteristics are likely to be important determinants of Chinese business 
decisions, including decisions regarding tax planning and implementation.  The 
increase in the economic importance and international influence of Chinese firms in 
recent years renders an assessment of how guanxi and audit independence relate to tax 
avoidance timely.  Secondly, we provide additional insights into how relations 
developed with external auditors and clients may influence management’s propensity 
to engage in tax-aggressive activities.  We also provide evidence that, collectively, 
political connections, bureaucratic privilege, audit–client affiliations, and audit fee 
dependency are significantly associated with perceptions of corporate tax aggression.  
These results suggest that adverse effects such as tax aggression may arise from 
guanxi-related business dealings.  Thirdly, the results presented herein can be 
extrapolated to other guanxi-related business pursuits in China and other relation-
based economies.  For instance, guanxi (and auditor independence) may exert 
influence on other corporate activities such as capital management initiatives and 
board structuring and compensation.    
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review 
of the literature on the topics of guanxi, audit independence and corporate tax 
avoidance in relation-based economies. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 
discusses the research design. Section 5 summarises and analyses the empirical 
results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Guanxi and audit independence 
Guanxi, which is loosely defined as ‘interpersonal relationships’, is critical in driving 
social behaviour and decision-making in China (Lovett et al., 1999; Fan et al., 2012a).  
It involves networks of individuals establishing relations to further business 
opportunities.  Individuals are bonded through mutual obligation to one another rather 
than through written contracts or records (Lovett et al., 1999; Chua et al., 2009).  
Guanxi may assist in the provision of resources or enable a firm to operate effectively 
in a difficult environment.  In China, guanxi networks avoid the use of written 
agreements, preferring social ties to achieve business objectives (Fan et al., 2013).  In 
many cases, successful private firms have strong guanxi links with government 
officials (Fan et al., 2012a).  Thus, Su et al. (2003) suggest that guanxi should be 
classified into favour-seeking and rent-seeking types.  Favour-seeking guanxi is 
‘culturally rooted, signifying social contracts and interpersonal exchanges of resources 
in a collectivistic society’ (Su et al., 2003, p. 310).  Rent-seeking guanxi, in contrast, 
‘reflects on institutional norms signifying social collusion based on power exchanges 
in a hybrid Chinese socialist market economy’ (Su et al., 2003, p. 310). Fan et al. 
(2012a) carried out the first empirical study examining the effects of favour- and rent-
seeking guanxi on Chinese auditors’ ethical judgments.  Their results suggest that both 
types are associated with those judgments.  
 
 




The prior literature provides a wealth of evidence indicating that guanxi is likely to 
have an important bearing on managerial incentives and capacity to achieve corporate 
objectives in relation-based capitalistic regimes in which politics and business 
ventures are closely linked.  For instance, Adhikari et al. (2006) report that firms with 
political connections had lower effective tax rates over a 10-year period in Malaysia.  
Fan et al. (2008) show firms with politically connected CEOs to underperform those 
without connections, whereas Li et al. (2008) note that Communist Party membership 
helps private entrepreneurs to obtain loans from state financial institutions.  Francis et 
al. (2009) find that firms in China with greater political connections are characterised 
by higher offering prices in the IPO market.  Tu et al. (2013) provide evidence to show 
that political connections are more important in China, which has higher levels of 
corruption and law enforcement than developed countries.  Based on this accumulated 
evidence, it is therefore not unreasonable to expect that reliance on social networks 
and political connections may affect firms’ propensity to engage in tax aggression. 
Audit independence is a fundamental premise of accounting professionals’ code of 
ethics.  It requires accounting professionals to bear in mind that they are required to 
act with integrity and in an objective manner (i.e., independence in-fact) and also 
avoid any activities that could create the public perception that their independence is 
impaired (i.e., independence in-appearance).  The audit–client relationship is one of 
the most important issues in audit independence in-appearance.  Audit independence 
can create real and apparent concerns in the minds of various stakeholders (Fan et al., 
2013).  Prior studies suggest that corporate tax aggressiveness is negatively associated 
with audit independence, an issue discussed in further detail in Section 3. 
2.2 China’s tax laws  
China’s income tax laws have evolved radically over the past decade (Sharkey, 2004; 
Deloitte, 2014; Chan et al., 2013a).  The country now has transfer pricing, thin 
capitalisation and controlled foreign company rules, as well as a General Anti-
Avoidance Rule (GAAR).  The introduction of GAAR in China in January 2008 is 
contained in the Enterprise Income Tax Law (EITL), EITL Implementing Regulations, 
and Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on Issuing the Measures for the 
Implementation of Special Tax Adjustments (for Trial Implementation).  The 2008 
EITL applies to both domestic and foreign-invested enterprises, generally at the same 
corporate tax rate (25%), with special rates applying in certain cases.  However, the 
application of GAAR is not coherent in China, with different interpretations and 
applications being applied in different provinces (Ernst and Young, 2013).   
Additionally, numerous tax incentives, exemptions, and privileges are provided to 
firms, depending on their industry sector (e.g., qualified new and high-technology 
sector firms), geographical location and level of foreign investment.  Industry-oriented 
tax incentive policies are aimed at directing investments into sectors and projects that 
are encouraged and supported by the state (PWC, 2012).  
China’s tax law and policy are developed jointly by the State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  The SAT is the body charged 
with collecting tax and enforcing compliance, and is assisted by the state and local tax 
bureaus at the provincial level (PWC, 2012).  Enterprise income tax is imposed on the 
worldwide income of a resident enterprise (with a credit available for tax paid on 
foreign-source income), on China-source income, and on income effectively 
connected with the establishment in China of a non-resident enterprise.  The Chinese 
tax authorities may impose, upon SAT approval, anti-tax avoidance measures if they 
 
 




suspect that an enterprise has abused preferential tax arrangements, abused tax havens 
for tax-avoidance purposes, or engaged in activities with no commercial purpose such 
as transfer pricing or income shifting arrangements that are not at arm’s length (PWC, 
2012). 
2.3 Tax aggression of Chinese firms 
According to the US research and advocacy group Global Financial Integrity, China 
was subject to a US$3.79 trillion illegal capital outflow between 2000 and 2011 
(Global Financial Integrity, 2012).  Of the $US2.83 trillion that flowed illicitly out of 
China in the 2005–2011 period, $US595.8 billion ended up as cash deposits or 
financial assets such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds and derivatives in tax havens 
(Global Financial Integrity, 2012).  Tax havens are jurisdictions that offer beneficial 
financial, legal and tax regimes, as they impose nil or nominal taxes, have laws or 
administrative practices that prevent the effective exchange of information, and/or 
lack transparency with regard to financial and taxation arrangements, including 
regulatory, legal and administrative provisions, and access to financial records (Hines 
& Rice, 1990; Wilson, 2009; GAO, 2008a; 2008b; OECD, 2006; 2012).
5
  A 
significant portion of the capital outflows from China makes a round-trip back to the 
country as recorded foreign direct investment (FDI).  Round-tripped FDI is given 
preferential treatment vis-à-vis domestic capital in the form of tax concessions and a 
government guarantee of the loans extended by foreign corporations to domestic firms 
(Global Financial Integrity, 2012).   
Capital flows typically pass through the offshore financial centers of Hong Kong, the 
Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands (BVI) (Buckley et al., 2007; Sutherland 
et al., 2012).  By 2003, the Cayman Islands accounted for 28.3 percent of total 
Chinese FDI flows.  By 2006, it had increased to 44 percent (US$7.83 billion) 
(Sutherland et al., 2012).  By 2006, the Cayman Islands and BVI together accounted 
for 47.5 percent of Chinese FDI flows and 25.3 percent of Chinese outward FDI stock.  
Between 2004 and 2006, the BVI received far less outward Chinese overseas FDI, but 
accounted for a considerable portion of direct investments back into China.  Estimates 
of the net FDI flows from the Cayman Islands and BVI to China stood at a surplus of 
around US$16.5 billion in that period (Sutherland et al., 2012).  Overseas FDI to the 
BVI is generally thought to involve assets recycled through tax havens to accomplish 
the preferential treatment of foreign capital (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007).  
Capital also leaves China as FDI in such places as Hong Kong and the BVI, only to 
then be laundered in another jurisdiction and reinvested in China as FDI from Hong 
Kong or the BVI (Global Financial Integrity, 2012).  Large tax rate differentials 
among group subsidiaries domiciled in variably taxed jurisdictions (e.g. China, Hong 
Kong, the US, and various tax havens) provide incentives for firms to shift profits and 
deductible expenses such as interest and royalties among those subsidiaries (Huizinga 
& Laeven, 2008; Global Financial Integrity, 2012).  The tax benefits derived from 
financial flows to and from tax haven-incorporated firms have important implications 
for inequality and corruption in China (Global Financial Integrity, 2012). 
                                                          
5 The OECD’s (2006, 2012) list of 33 tax havens includes the following countries: Anguilla, Antigua and 
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the 
Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Malta, 
the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Montserrat, Nauru, the Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Panama, 
Samoa, San Marino, the Seychelles, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the 
Turks and Caicos Islands and Vanuatu. 
 
 




3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We now develop several hypotheses about the effects of guanxi and audit 
independence on perceptions of corporate tax aggressiveness.   
3.1 Favour-seeking guanxi 
Favour-seeking guanxi comprises: a) the network of relations, including management-
tax department relations and broader relations, developed with the government; b) 
close connections between the maintenance of business relations and financial 
success; and c) the notion that the achievement of business objectives requires 
connections or affiliations with the right people.  Corporate culture and managerial 
behaviour may influence the extent and nature of corporate tax avoidance (Dyreng et 
al., 2010).  Faccio et al. (2007) provide evidence to show that politically connected 
firms are more likely to receive assistance from the government such as the receipt of 
tax benefits (i.e., favourable tax arrangements and payments).  Perceived flexibility in 
terms of tax-related arrangements and negotiations between a politically connected 
firm and the government may serve to enhance management’s aggression in tax 
planning and the implementation of strategies to reduce taxes payable.  Appointment 
to a management position and the maintenance of that position may hinge on the 
existence of political affiliations.  Chan et al. (2013b) and Jian and Zhang (2013) 
assert that management may have incentives to please government officials through 
generous tax payments.  The Chinese government offers tax benefits to foreign-
invested enterprises, the nature of which can be dependent on favour-seeking guanxi.  
Jian and Zhang (2013) find that foreign-invested enterprises avoid taxes to a greater 
extent than their state-owned counterparts based on the tax benefits the government 
provides them.  Politically connected entrepreneurs can obtain preferential treatment 
from government officials based on the tenets of favour-seeking guanxi, which may 
assist their firm in deriving greater tax benefits.  Management may believe that these 
additional tax benefits will ultimately flow to shareholders, as they serve to boost the 
firm’s after-tax returns.  Further, Lo et al. (2010) and Chan et al. (2013b) purport that 
management may engage in tax-aggressive activities for the purpose of increasing 
resource retention within the firm, which will also ultimately benefit shareholders.  
Thus, the government privileges provided to select firms may have overlapping 
governmental policy initiatives and personal and corporate objectives.  
Additionally, politically connected managers may undertake more risky financial 
(including taxation) projects, as they may be assisted in the event of difficulties by the 
government or by politically connected financial institutions.  Tu et al. (2013) find that 
politically connected firms receive preferential treatment from the government, and, as 
a result, acquired higher-quality firms during the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  Political connections may also reduce the likelihood of a tax audit 
or that the tax audit will result in significant penalties.  In a parallel outcome to that 
reported by Tu et al. (2013), management may potentially abuse its political 
connections to exploit opportunities that enable the firm to derive greater tax benefits.  
Indeed, preferential tax treatment may exacerbate already aggressive tax-related 
activities.  Further, Chan et al. (2013b) assert that it is the government that appoints, 
motivates and disciplines SOE managers, who are in turn required to achieve the 
social and political objectives of the government.  To formally test the influence of 
favour-seeking guanxi on judgments of corporate tax avoidance, we develop the 
following (directional) hypotheses. 
 
 




H1a:  All else being equal, the effect of favour-seeking guanxi is positively 
associated with ethical judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness. 
H1b: All else being equal, the effect of favour-seeking guanxi is positively associated 
with ethical judgments that corporate tax aggressiveness is a good business strategy 
for the firm and its shareholders. 
3.2 Rent-seeking guanxi 
Rent-seeking guanxi comprises: a) bureaucratic privilege, whereby it is acceptable for 
benefits to be channeled to some parties at the expense of others; and b) the notion that 
it is acceptable behaviour for dominant parties to make all decisions and deals.  In a 
rules-based economy, this form of guanxi is akin to the managing director and 
chairperson of the firm being the same individual, who, accordingly, is unlikely to be 
independent.  The combined role of managing director and chairperson can 
significantly impair both a board’s important functions of monitoring, disciplining, 
and compensating senior managers, and its oversight, governance and disclosure 
policies (Kang et al., 2007).  Such duality also enables the CEO to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour that may exacerbate the degree of information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders and between the firm and bondholders (Fama 
& Jenson, 1983; Gul & Leung, 2004).  Chan et al. (2013b) find that non-government-
controlled Chinese listed firms with a higher percentage of board shareholdings and a 
CEO who also serves as the board chair tend to be more tax aggressive than SOEs and 
firms with stronger governance structures.  That finding implies that the existence of 
managers who assert control and attain bureaucratic privilege can diminish 
management’s monitoring capacity and increase the likelihood of tax aggressiveness.  
To formally test the influence of rent-seeking guanxi on corporate tax avoidance, we 
develop the following (directional) hypotheses. 
H2a:  All else being equal, the effect of rent-seeking guanxi is positively associated 
with ethical judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness. 
H2b: All else being equal, the effect of rent-seeking guanxi is positively associated 
with ethical judgments that corporate tax aggressiveness is a good business strategy 
for the firm and its shareholders. 
3.3  External auditor independence in-fact 
We examine the relationship between respondents’ opinions regarding judgments of 
corporate tax aggressiveness in order to determine: a) whether the external auditing 
firm should be independent in performing an audit; and b) whether the auditor should 
behave with integrity and objectivity in performing the audit. Frankel et al. (2002) 
provide empirical evidence showing that the provision of non-audit-related services 
reduces auditor independence and thereby lowers the quality of the firm’s financial 
information. Alexander et al. (2008) find that the opportunities for firm management 
to engage in corporate tax aggressiveness increase as audit independence diminishes.  
Elder et al. (2008) report empirical support for the idea that auditor-provided tax 
services reduce auditor independence.  Finally, Armstrong et al. (2012) find that the 
higher the proportion of taxation fees provided by the auditor, the lower the level of 
the firm’s effective tax rate.  In the Chinese context, Shafer and Simmons (2011) 
demonstrate that certain dimensions of an ethical culture exert a significant effect on 
Chinese tax practitioners’ intentions to engage in tax-aggressive strategies.  We 
 
 




therefore posit that firms with weak external auditor independence are more likely to 
engage in tax aggressiveness.  To formally test the influence of external auditor 
independence in-fact on judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness, we develop the 
following (directional) hypotheses. 
H3a:  All else being equal, the likelihood of external auditor independence is 
negatively associated with ethical judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness. 
H3b: All else being equal, the likelihood of external auditor independence is 
negatively associated with ethical judgments that corporate tax aggressiveness is a 
good business strategy for the firm and its shareholders. 
3.4 External auditor independence in-appearance 
We now examine the relationship between respondents’ opinions regarding judgments 
of corporate tax aggressiveness and whether the external audit firm should: a) avoid a 
close relationship with clients; b) avoid an employment offer from a client; and c) 
avoid dependency on the derivation of fee revenue from a particular client or small 
client group.  In a rules-based or Western economy, independence in-appearance by an 
external auditor is likely to be negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm 
engaging in corporate tax aggressiveness.  If auditors develop connections with clients 
and become financially reliant on substantial fees from those clients (particularly fees 
related to non-audit services), then the auditors’ independence is potentially 
compromised, as they may become reluctant to draw attention to problems with the 
clients’ tax or other business-related activities (Becker et al., 1998; Freise et al., 2008).  
However, Liu et al. (2011) contend that the relationship between auditor-management 
affiliations and audit quality depends on the behavioural and business context.  In the 
case of a relation-based economy such as China, linkages developed between external 
auditors and management appear to be essential to achieving financial (including 
taxation) objectives and are based on familiarity and trust between the parties 
concerned (Chua et al., 2009).  These authors further contend that auditor-
management affiliations increase the likelihood that a firm will receive a clean audit 
opinion.  Similarly, these affiliations may be regarded as essential in achieving the 
firm’s financial (and taxation) objectives and strategies.  Further, Gul (2006) finds that 
Malaysian firms with political connections are characterised by the use of external 
auditors that exert greater audit effort and charge higher audit fees.  Finally, the 
Chinese audit market is effectively controlled by the government
6
 (Liu et al., 2011). It 
is therefore not unreasonable to assert that closer connections between external 
auditors and management may facilitate aggressive tax-avoidance strategies.  To 
formally test the influence of external auditor independence (in-appearance) on 
judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness, we develop our final set of (directional) 
hypotheses: 
H4a:  All else being equal, an external auditor’s affiliation with management is 
positively associated with ethical judgments of corporate tax aggressiveness. 
                                                          
6 The Chinese government controls the audit market through the Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (CICPA), which is effectively controlled by the MOF.  Further government control of the 
audit market stems from the services of CICPA being used by local governments (Wang et al., 2008). 
 
 




H4b: All else being equal, an external auditor’s affiliation with management is 
positively associated with ethical judgments that corporate tax aggressiveness is a 
good business strategy for the firm and its shareholders. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1  Sample selection and methodology 
The study reported herein used a survey to collect data on perceptions of corporate tax 
aggression and the benefits of that aggression.  The survey instruments comprised: 
(1) a self-administered questionnaire and (2) two hypothetical cases of corporate 
income tax aggression (Appendix C).  The self-administered questionnaire solicited 
demographic information (age, gender, qualifications and position) and asked 
questions about Chinese business personnel’s perceptions of guanxi (Appendix A) and 
audit independence (Appendix B).  The study sample comprised Chinese business 
personnel enrolled in an MBA course at either Zhongnan University of Economics and 
Law or Dongbei University of Finance and Economics who are also currently 
employed by listed and unlisted companies located in Hubei and Liaoning provinces.  
Independent instructors recruited the participating MBA students, asking them to 
complete the questionnaire at the end of class.  The instructors provided students with 
an information sheet and also explained the objectives and importance of the 
questionnaire and how to complete it.  Respondents were assured that their responses 
would be anonymous and confidential, with no personal information relating to 
respondents or their employing firm disclosed.  Responses were given on a nine-point 
Likert scale anchored on ‘strongly disagree’ (1) and ‘strongly agree’ (9).  The survey 
instrument was translated from English to Chinese by a professional translator.  The 
Chinese version was then pre-tested on the MBA instructors to identify any potential 
problems with understanding prior to administration to the participating MBA 
students.  A sample of 176 Chinese business personnel studying an MBA course was 
used to collect information on the two types of guanxi and corporate tax avoidance by 
Chinese firms.  Two incomplete survey instruments were excluded from the study, 
resulting in a final useable sample of 174.  Demographic information pertaining to the 








Table 1:  Demographic attributes of Chinese business personnel that responded 
to the questionnaire 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Strongly                                      Strongly 
 Disagree                                                                   Agree 
 
  Sample size % 
Gender Male 90 52 
 Female  84 48 
    
Education level   Bachelor  131 75 
 Master 41 24 
 Other  2 1 
    
Age (years) 20–30 111 64 
 31–40 60 35 
 41–50 3 1 
 51 above 0 0 
    
Position   Independent board of director  1 1 
 Non-independent board of director  5 3 
 Financial controller/manager 17 10 
 Department manager 39 22 
 General staff 82 47 
 Accounting staff 30 18 
 
4.2 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is: a) a respondent’s likely ethical judgment on two tax-
aggressive activities (see Appendix C) undertaken by a firm if they were an executive 
director of that firm and b) the respondent’s ethical judgment on whether the business 
strategy of the firm undertaking those activities was beneficial to the firm and all of its 
shareholders.  The two tax-aggression cases revolve around two important 
mechanisms by which firms can reduce the corporate taxes they pay.  The first case 
involves the repatriation of funds from a tax haven-incorporated subsidiary located in 
the BVI back to a parent firm in mainland China.  The second involves the shifting of 
income and borrowings between a mainland Chinese firm and a Hong Kong 
subsidiary to obtain tax benefits in the form of lower taxes on income and higher 
deductions on borrowings, depending on where the funds are taxed.  It is likely that 
tax-aggressive firms will incorporate subsidiaries in tax havens to avoid having their 
foreign income subject to domestic corporate taxes (Desai et al., 2006).  Both cases 
involve tax-aggressive activities by Chinese multinational firms rather than SOEs.  
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with four questions on a 
9-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (9).  The 
first two questions, designed to measure the first dependent variable, that is, corporate 
tax aggressiveness, concerned their perception of whether management had 
aggressively avoided paying corporate taxes to the government in the two cases.  The 
last two questions, used to measure the second dependent variable, that is, tax business 
 
 




strategy, concerned the companies’ tax business strategy in the two cases.  An internal 
consistency test revealed that the alpha reliabilities of both tax aggressiveness (two 
items) (58%) and tax business strategy (two items) (62%) were acceptable given the 
small number of representative items. 
4.3 Independent variables 
Our independent variables are guanxi and audit independence.  Guanxi includes the 
two dimensions of favour-seeking guanxi and rent-seeking guanxi, and audit 
independence the two dimensions of audit independence in-fact and in-appearance.  
The level of Chinese business personnel’s favour- and rent-seeking guanxi 
orientations were measured using the seven-item guanxi scale in Fan et al. (2012b), 
and their level of perceptions of audit independence in-fact and in-appearance were 
measured using the seven-item audit independence scale in Fan et al. (2012c).  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using analysis of moment structures (AMOS) was 
performed to assess each original measurement model’s goodness-of-fit.  The purpose 
of this exercise was to confirm the most appropriate measurement model for each 
independent variable in the current sample.  Model assessment was conducted using 
X
2
 statistics (p ≥ 0.05) (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993) and X
2
/df < 2 (Wheaton et al., 
1977) and goodness-of-fit indices such as CFI ≥ 0.95 (Bentler, 1990) and root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ 0.06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
The results of CFA on the guanxi variable (i.e., p = 0.000, X
2 
= 178.16, df = 13, X
2
/df 
= 3.41, comparative fit index [CFI] = 0.93 and RMSEA = 0.12) indicated a very poor 
fit for the two-factor seven-item model based on the model assessment criteria (refer 
to the previous section).  Thus, model re-specifications were undertaken to find a 
model that better represented the data.  After reviewing the significant values of the 
modification indices and standardised residual covariance (i.e., larger than two) 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998), the items right people 
and back-door deals were found to represent misspecifications of the original model.  
They were therefore deleted incrementally, and the final results (i.e., p = 0.11, X
2 
= 
7.34, df = 4, X
2
/df = 1.84, CFI = 0.99 and RMSEA = 0.07) suggested that this short 
version of the model was most appropriate for the current sample, although the 
RMSEA value (0.07) was slightly higher than the predetermined criteria (0.06).  
However, such results are still considered a good fit in the literature (e.g., Cheung & 
Rensvold, 2002; Du & Tang, 2005; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  Accordingly, we 
used the two-factor five-item model in data analysis examining Chinese business 
personnel’s guanxi orientations and in further analysis, that is, of those orientations’ 
influence on Chinese business personnel’s judgments about tax aggressiveness.  The 
overall reliability coefficient using Cronbach’s alpha for favour-seeking guanxi is 
0.78, and that for rent-seeking guanxi is 0.72. 
Similarly, the CFA results for the audit independence variable (i.e., p = 0.000, X
2 
= 
161.68, df = 14, X
2
/df = 11.55, CFI = 0.79 and RMSEA = 0.25) also indicated a very 
poor fit for the two-factor seven-item model based on the model assessment criteria.  
Analysis suggested that the items resist client pressures to maintain independence and 
avoid dependency on certain clients represent likely misspecifications of the model.  
Hence, CFA was conducted again with these two items deleted one-by-one until a 
satisfactory model was identified.  The final results (i.e., p = 0.19, X
2 
= 6.07, df = 4, 
X
2
/df = 1.52, CFI = 0.99 and RMSEA = 0.06) suggested that the short version of the 
model was most appropriate for the current sample.  Accordingly, it was used to 
examine Chinese business personnel’s perceptions of audit independence and to 
 
 




further examine their ethical judgments concerning tax aggression.  The results of the 
Cronbach’s alpha measure indicated that both audit independence in-fact (0.85) and 
in-appearance (0.83) were reliable.  
4.4  Control variables 
Four demographic control variables were included in the study: gender, qualifications, 
age and position in the firm.  Gender (GEN) controlled for differences in the business 
ethics of the female and male respondents with respect to their judgments concerning 
corporate tax avoidance.  Betz et al. (1989) and Peni & Vähämaa (2010) find firms 
with female CFOs to adopt a more conservative, risk-averse financial reporting style 
than their counterparts with male CFOs.  Fallan (1999) observes that female students 
adopt a stricter attitude towards tax evasion than their male peers.  It was thus likely 
that female respondents would tend to take a stricter view of corporate tax 
aggressiveness than their male counterparts.  GEN takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
is female and of 0 otherwise.  
Respondents’ age (AGE) was included to control for the level of experience and 
monitoring capacity (Ferris et al., 2003).  Cochran et al. (1984) claim that younger 
managers are perceived to have greater career growth opportunities because they are 
more likely, and willing, to make risky corporate decisions and undertake risky 
activities.  Hence, younger managers may also be prepared to undertake risky 
activities in terms of tax aggression, and thus may have a stronger preference for such 
aggression.  
The qualifications (QUAL) of respondents was also included as a control variable 
because it was expected that more qualified respondents would make more informed 
judgments regarding tax-aggressive planning and its effects on the firm and its 
shareholders.  Finally, their position (POS) was included to control for differences in 
professional ability, knowledge and monitoring capacity with respect to corporate tax 
avoidance.  Recent research (e.g., Frank et al., 2009; Dyreng et al., 2010) suggests that 
aggressive tax planning is associated with managerial opportunism and capabilities.  
Managers can use their professional ability and knowledge effectively to gauge 
whether firms are undertaking risky and aggressive tax planning activities and to 
monitor compliance with applicable tax laws (Carter et al., 2010). 
4.5 Base regression model 
Our base ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is estimated as follows: 
CTAi or CTSi = α0it + β1FGi + β2RGi + β3AUDINDi + β4CLRELi +β5GENi + β6AGEi 
 + β7QUALi + β8POSi + εi                                                                                                    
(1)    
where: 
i = respondents 1 through 174; 
CTA = ethical judgment that firm is aggressively avoiding paying tax to the 
government from executive directors perspective based on two 
international cases (see Appendix C); 
 
 




CTS = ethical judgment that corporate tax planning from executive director’s 
perspective is good for the firm and its shareholders based on two 
international cases (see Appendix C); 
FG = favour seeking guanxi comprised of three items; 
RG = rent seeking guanxi comprised of two items; 
AUDIND = external auditor independence comprised of two items; 
CLREL = external auditor and client relationship comprised of three items; 
GEN = a dummy variable of 1 if the respondent is female, otherwise 0; 
AGE = age of the respondent in years measured as 1 if the respondent is aged 
between 20–30 years, 2 if the respondent is aged between 31–40 years, 
3 if the respondent is aged between 41–50 years and 4 if the 
respondent is aged from 51 years; 
QUAL = the highest qualification of the respondent scored as 1 if a bachelor 
degree, 2 if a post graduate master degree is held and 3 if a post-
doctoral degree; 
POS = nature of position held in the firm scored as 1 through to 5 for each of 
non-independent board, independent board member, financial 
controller, department head, administration staff and accountant 
respectively; 
 = The error term. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (ethical judgment 
that the firm is aggressively avoiding paying tax (CTA) and ethical judgment that 
corporate tax planning is good for the firm and its shareholders (CTS)), the 
independent variables (favour-seeking guanxi (FG), rent-seeking guanxi (RG), auditor 
independence (AUDIND) and external auditor–client relationship (CLREL)), and 
control variables (GEN, AGE, QUAL and POS).  Dependent variables CTA and CTS 
have a mean (standard deviation [s.d.]) of 5.51 (1.33) and 5.10 (1.44), respectively.  
FG has a mean (s.d.) of 7.95 (1.35), indicating that respondents strongly believed, on 
average, that the development and maintenance of a network of relationships with 
individuals likely to be useful in business was a necessary requirement for business 
success.  Their perception was that business is conducted by and through networks 
held together by strong social relations.  RG has a mean (s.d.) of 3.91 (2.11), 
indicating that respondents maintained a weak belief, on average, that bureaucratic 
privilege is acceptable and that dominant parties can make all decisions.  AUDIND 
has a mean (s.d.) of 8.33 (1.41), suggesting that respondents strongly agreed, on 
average, that external auditors should be independent in performing audits and should 
conduct those audits with integrity and objectivity.  Finally, CLREL has a mean (s.d.) 
of 7.65 (1.60), indicating that respondents strongly agreed, on average, that external 
 
 




auditors should avoid a close relationship with clients, employment offers from clients 
and conflicts of interest involving clients.  The mean, standard deviation and range of 
control variables are also presented in Table 2.  An acceptable range of variation is 
observed for all variables, and there is a reasonable level of consistency between the 
means and medians, reflecting the normality of the distributions. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics—full sample 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
CTA 174 5.51 1.33 1 7 
CTS 174 5.10 1.44 1 7 
FG 174 7.95 1.35 1 9 
RG 174 3.91 2.11 1 9 
AUDIND 174 8.33 1.41 1 9 
CLREL 174 7.65 1.60 1 9 
GEN 174 0.48 .501 0 1 
AGE 174 1.38 .521 1 4 
QUAL 173 2.23 .436 1 3 
POS 169 4.63 1.02 1 5 
 
 
Variable definitions: CTA = ethical judgment that firm is aggressively avoiding 
paying tax to the government from executive directors perspective based on two 
international cases (see Appendix C); CTS = ethical judgment that corporate tax 
planning from executive director’s perspective is good for the firm and its 
shareholders based on two international cases (see Appendix C); FG = favour seeking 
guanxi comprised of three items; RG = rent seeking guanxi comprised of two items; 
AUDIND = external auditor independence comprised of two items; CLREL = external 
auditor and client relationship comprised of three items; GEN = a dummy variable of 
1 if the respondent is female, otherwise 0; AGE = age of the respondent in years 
measured as 1 if the respondent is aged between 20–30 years, 2 if the respondent is 
aged between 31–40 years, 3 if the respondent is aged between 41–50 years and 4 if 
the respondent is aged from 51 years; QUAL = the highest qualification of the 
respondent scored as 1 if a bachelor degree, 2 if a post graduate master degree is held 
and 3 if a post-doctoral degree; POS = nature of position held in the firm scored as 1 
through to 5 for each of non-independent board, independent board member, financial 
controller, department head, administration staff and accountant respectively.  
5.2 Correlation results 
The Pearson pairwise correlation results are reported in Table 3.  We find significant 
correlations (with predicted signs) between CTA and CLREL, between GEN and CTS 
and FG, and between CLREL and GEN. Table 3 also shows that only moderate levels 
of collinearity exist between the independent variables.  We computed variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) when estimating our base regression model to test for signs of 
multicollinearity between these variables.  No VIFs exceeded 5, and thus 
multicollinearity was deemed not to be a problem in our study (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
 




Table 3: Pearson correlation results 
 
CTA CTS FG RG AUDIND CLREL GEN AGE QUAL POS 
CTA 1.00 
         CTS 0.50** 1.00 
        FG 0.12 0.23* 1.00 
       RG 0.11 0.10 0.37** 1.00 
      AUDIND -0.01 0.05 0.47** -0.07 1.00 
     CLREL 0.20* 0.18* 0.49** 0.03 0.68** 1.00 
    GEN -0.16* -0.14* -0.14* -0.03 -0.08 -0.12 1.00 
   
AGE -0.02 0.00 0.16* 
-
0.14* 0.08 0.12 -0.15 1.00 
  QUAL -0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.25* 1.00 
 POS 0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.09 -0.35* -0.03 1.00 
Variable definitions: see Table 1 for variable definitions.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. The p–
values are one-tailed for directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise. 
5.3 Regression results 
Table 4 reports the regression results for our base regression model.  We find that 
CTA has a significantly positive association with FG (p < .10), RG (p < .05) and 
CLREL (p < .10), and a significantly negative association with AUDIND (p < .10).  
The respondents judged firms engaged in aggressive tax activities to be more likely to 
have established favour- and rent-seeking guanxi networks.  Additionally, they judged 
that firms engaged in these activities also tended to have stronger client–auditor 
relations (auditor independence in-appearance) and weaker auditor independence 
(auditor independence in-fact).  Thus, the results support H1a, H2a, H3a and H4a.  We 
also find CTS to have a significantly positive association with FG (p < .05) and 
CLREL (p < .10).  The respondents believed that tax aggressive activities are good for 
the firm and its shareholders when favour- but not rent-seeking guanxi relations were 
in place.  These results support H1b, but not H2b.  Further, respondents who believed 
that tax-aggressive activities are good for the firm and its shareholders tended to have 
stronger opinions about client–auditor relations (auditor independence in-appearance), 
thus supporting H4b.  No significant difference is observed between CTS and 
AUDIND, and hence H3b is not supported.  Moreover, female respondents tended to 
judge firms as less tax-aggressive than their male counterparts.  The other control 
variables are not significant.  Our model has variably significant predictors, but low 
absolute adjusted R-square values (8.8% or 14%), possibly because of the dispersion 
in those values around a line of best fit.  Although the adjusted R-square values are 
small in absolute terms, they do not detract from the usefulness of our model, as we 
find a consistent and reliable association between CTA or CTS and the predictor 
variables. 
Overall, our regression results show that the two types of guanxi, favour-seeking and 
rent-seeking, are significantly associated with ethical judgments about corporate tax 
aggressiveness.  Perceptions of audit independence in-fact are significantly negatively 
associated with these ethical judgments, whereas audit independence in-appearance is 
 
 




positively associated with them.  Further, we find significantly positive relations to 
exist between perceptions that tax-aggressive activities are good for the firm and its 
shareholders and both favour-seeking guanxi and stronger client–auditor relations. 
Table 4: Regression results—base regression model 
CTAi or CTSi = α0i + β1FGi + β2RGi + β3AUDINDi + β4CLRELi +β5GENi + β6AGEi 
 + β7QUALi + β8POSi + εi   
                                                                                                  
Variable  Predicted sign CTA Predicted sign CTS 




FG (H1a) + .173 
(1.850)* 
(H1b) + .263 
(2.583)** 
RG (H2a) + .107 
(2.073)** 
(H2b) + .043 
(.761) 
AUDIND (H3a) – -.169 
(-1.871)* 
(H3b) – -.118 
(-1.215) 
CLREL (H4a) + .163 
(1.928)* 
(H4b) + .147 
(1.731)* 
















     
Adj. R
2
 (%)  14.00%  8.80% 
N  174  174 
Variable definitions: See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.  
a
Coefficient estimates with the t-statistics in parentheses.  
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
We performed several robustness checks to assess the reliability of the regression 
results reported in Table 4.  First, we carried out the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg 
test for heteroskedasticity, as the variability of a dependent variable such as CTA or 
CTS may be unequal across the range of values of a predictor variable.  This test tests 
the null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus the alternative that they 
are a multiplicative function of one or more variables.  Using either CTA or CTS as 
the dependent variable, the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test indicated that our 
data is homoscedastic, as we obtained small chi-square values and non-significant p-
values.  Second, we dropped all of the control variables from the regression model, 
and obtained similar results for FG, RG, AUDIND and CLREL.  Third, we entered the 
 
 




control variables consecutively into the regression model,
7
 and our main findings 
remained unchanged.  Finally, we added each of our four independent variables 
successively into the regression model to test the stability of the regression 
coefficients and robustness of our results.  On the whole, the regression coefficients 
for FG, RG, AUDIND and CLREL were stable and statistically significant (with the 
predicted signs).  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we examine the association between guanxi and audit independence and 
ethical perceptions of corporate tax aggressiveness in Chinese firms that operate in an 
international context.  Based on a survey completed by 174 respondents in 2013, we 
find that two types of guanxi, favour-seeking guanxi and rent-seeking guanxi, are 
significantly associated with ethical judgments of tax aggressiveness.  Perceptions of 
audit independence in-fact are significantly negatively associated with these 
judgments, whereas audit independence in-appearance is positively associated with 
them.  Further, significantly positive relations exist between perceptions that tax-
aggressive activities are good for the firm and its shareholders and both favour-
seeking guanxi and stronger client-auditor relations.  This study contributes to the 
literature on the importance of guanxi in influencing managerial activities, 
opportunism and business outcomes.  It also empirically demonstrates that audit 
independence and the client–auditor relationship play a critical role in influencing 
managerial behaviour.  
This study is subject to several limitations.  First, the sample was drawn from 
respondents asked to make judgments regarding guanxi, auditor independence and tax 
avoidance as if they were the CEO of a firm.  Second, our base regression model may 
have been incomplete.  For example, the role of tax authorities could have an effect on 
international tax avoidance activities.  Future research should consider this issue. 
  
                                                          
7 Entering control variables progressively into a regression model provides an indication of whether a 
particular control variable is significantly driving the model outcomes (Hair et al., 2006). 
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8.       APPENDICES 
8.1 Appendix 1: Guanxi orientation  
a. Favour-seeking guanxi 
1) In business, it is important to maintain a good network of relationships 
2) Maintaining good relationships is the best way to enhance business 
3) Doing business involves knowing the right people 
4) Developing the right contacts helps in the smooth running of a business 
 
b. Rent-seeking guanxi 
1) Back-door deals are alright as long as those involved in the process benefit 
2) Bureaucratic privilege, which benefits some parties at the expense of others is to be expected 
3) It is acceptable behaviour for the dominant parties to a deal to make all the decisions. 
(Source: Fan et al., 2012b) 
 
8.2 Appendix 2: Code of professional ethics 
Do you regard it as reasonable to expect auditors: 
a. Independence in-fact 
1) to be independent in performing an audit? 
2) to act with integrity and objectivity in performing an audit? 
3) to resist clients’ pressures to maintain independence? 
 
b. Independence in-appearance  
4) to avoid a close relationship with clients? 
5) to avoid an employment offer from a client? 
6) to avoid dependency on fees from certain clients? 
7) to avoid a conflict of interest with clients? 
(Source: Fan et al., 2012c) 
 
(The guanxi scale is extracted from survey questionnaire.  The respondents were asked to circle the 
one answer that best describes his/her view of each question using a nine-point Likely scale from 
‘Strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly agree’ (9)).  
 
8.3 Appendix 3: Corporate tax aggression cases 
Situation 1 
Company A manufactures steel in China.  It is listed on the Shanghai stock exchange.  The 
management of Company A decides to list on the New York Stock exchange and establish an offshore 
subsidiary in the British Virgin Islands (BVI).  BVI is characterised by secrecy laws making it difficult 
for tax authorities to trace the flow of profits from a company to the BVI and then back to mainland 
China.  Thus Company A transfers profits to a holding company in the BVI and waits for two years, 
when it then sends the profits back to mainland China disguised as ‘foreign investment’, which is 
either not taxed or taxed at a lower rate than in China.  
 
Situation 2 
Company A also establishes a subsidiary in Hong Kong, which is listed on the Hong Kong stock 
exchange.  Company A makes large profits which are sent to a subsidiary in Hong Kong.  The transfer 
of funds from Company A to the Hong Kong company is disguised as service fees or dividends.  
Management of company A has sent the funds to Hong Kong because they are subject to relatively 
 
 




lower corporate tax rates (16.5% in Hong Kong as opposed to 25% in mainland China) meaning that 
overall tax payable for the corporate group is lower.   At the same time, the Hong Kong company 
borrows funds in Hong Kong and then sends the funds back to company A for its use.  Company A 
can claim a greater corporate tax deduction on the borrowed funds owing to the tax rate differences 
between China and Hong Kong. 
 
Assume you are currently an executive director working for Company A who had nothing to do 
with the establishment of any of the above tax arrangements.  Please answer each question, 
circling one number that best describes the extent of your agreement. 
 
1. I believe that Company A is aggressively avoiding paying tax to the government with respect to 
Situation 1.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                   Agree 
 
2. I believe that Company A is aggressively avoiding paying tax to the government with respect to 
Situation 2.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly                                    Strongly 
Disagree                                                                   Agree 
 
3. In respect of Situation 1, I believe that the business strategy of Company A is good for the firm 
and all of its shareholders. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly                                    Strongly 
Disagree                                                                   Agree 
 
4. In respect of Situation 2, I believe that the business strategy of Company A is good for the firm 
and all of its shareholders. 
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